

**RESERVED
BENCH NO. 1**

**THE U.P. REAL ESTATE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
AT
LUCKNOW
D733 of 2023**

Valencia Homes (Hawelia Group) Applicant/Appellant
Versus
Bhawna Koul Respondent.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice (Dr.) D.K. Arora, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Sanjai Khare, Judicial Member

1. Before we proceed to examine the instant matter/issue, we deem it proper to place on record that on demitting office by Technical Member from 26.09.2023 the judicial functioning of the Tribunal had come to stand still with effect from 27.09.2023. On receipt of the notification dated 28.11.2023 with respect to appointment of Judicial Member, in the larger interest as well as to resume the judicial functioning of the Tribunal and to achieve the mandate of Section 44(5) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act 2016 read with Regulation 22 and 25 a Bench consisting of Chairman and Judicial Member was constituted vide order dated 01.12.2023. The Registry was directed to issue cause list of fresh appeals and re-schedule the cause list of pending appeals from 27.09.2023 on joining of the Judicial Member. Accordingly an office order dated 02.12.2023 was issued by the Registrar, which reads as under:--

OFFICE ORDER

It is hereby informed to all the concerned that the Tribunal was working with single Bench consisting of Hon'ble Chairman and Hon'ble Technical Member after demitting office by the Hon'ble Judicial Member on

31.12.2022. Hon'ble Technical Member also demitted office on 26.09.2023 and Hon'ble Administrative Member being on unauthorized leave from 30.09.2022 (who finally resigned on 29.10.2023) resulting the judicial functioning of the Tribunal to tune to standstill with effect from 27.09.2023.

The State Government vide Notification dated 28.11.2023 has appointed Hon'ble Judicial Member and as such presently, Hon'ble Chairman and Hon'ble Judicial Member having judicial back ground are available.

As per Section 43(3) of the Act 2016 every Bench of the Appellate Tribunal is to consist of at least one Judicial Member and one Administrative or Technical Member. The Appellate Tribunal is required to scrutinize judicially the appeals against the order of Regulatory Authority or Adjudicating Officer. Rule 30 of the Rules 2016 empowers the Appellate Tribunal to call upon such experts or consultants from the fields of economics, commerce, accountancy, real estate, competition, construction, architecture or engineering or from any other discipline as it deems necessary, to assist the Appellate Tribunal in the conduct of any enquiry or proceedings before it.

Section 55 of the Act 2016 protects the acts and proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal from being invalid merely for the reason of any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal or any defect in the appointment of a person acting as a Member of the Appellate Tribunal or any irregularity in the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal not affecting the merits of the case.

Accordingly in the larger interest and expeditious disposal of appeals as per mandate of Section 44(5) of the Act 2016 the Bench for hearing of appeals is constituted with Hon'ble Chairman & Hon'ble Judicial Member for judicial scrutiny of the appeals and in case any expert opinion/assistance is required the same will be taken as per provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules 2016 in appropriate cases or such cases will be deferred till availability of Administrative/Technical Member.

On joining of Hon'ble Judicial Member, the Registry is directed to issue cause list of fresh appeals and re-schedule the cause list of pending appeals from 27.09.2023 and upload the same on the website of the Tribunal and also inform all the parties/legal representatives about the same.

This order is issued with the approval of Hon'ble Chairman.

The judicial functioning of the Tribunal resumed with effect from 18.12.2023 after joining of the Judicial Member and the said Bench is still continuing on account of non-appointment of Technical and Administrative Members.

2. Now we proceed to deal with the instant matter.
3. Heard Sri Tushar Bahadur, co-counsel of learned counsel for applicant on the application for condonation of delay. No one is present on behalf of the respondent.
4. On 01.03.2024 Sri Suryansh Narula, Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent and submitted that he has instructions to appear on behalf of respondent, hence 10 days' time was granted to him to file objection to the application for condonation of delay as well as grounds of appeal along with *vakalatnama*.
5. In the instant case the applicant has filed two applications for condonation of delay, one on 14.07.2023 and other on 12.12.2023 during the pendency of first application with the same contents as narrated in first application.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is assailing the order dated 02.01.2023, passed by the Adjudicating Officer of the Regulatory Authority, the same was uploaded on the UP RERA portal on 03.01.2023, whereby the learned Authority has ordered the appellant to pay the compensation for delay in handing over the possession @ Rs.5/- per sq.ft. per month for the period 01.01.2017 to 30.05.2017 and further @ MCLR+1% on

Rs.58,88,750/- for the period from 01.05.2017 to 22.06.2019 to the respondent. The present appeal ought to have been filed by 04.03.2023 and there is a delay of 120 days in filing the instant appeal.

7. Learned counsel for applicant submits that the impugned order was passed and uploaded on the portal on 03.01.2023. The appellant's legal team studied the order and discussed with the counsels regarding filing of appeal against the said order. In the month of February, the counsel for appellant suffered from kidney ailment and was treated at Jaypee Hospital, Noida. Various tests and ultrasound got done on 04.03.2023 and the counsel was under bed rest for about 2 weeks. When the counsel recovered from the kidney ailment, he collected all necessary documents for preparing the appeal and the present appeal is being filed.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that there was sufficient cause for not being able to file the appeal within the stipulated period and the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate but only due to bonafide and genuine reasons as explained above.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant while placing reliance of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy**, (2013) 12 SCC 649, reiterated the principles applicable to an application for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court stressed that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach. The expression 'sufficient cause' as it appears in the Act, must be interpreted and understood, in the proper spirit as these terms are elastic enough to be applied liberally in the interest of Justice
10. Learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai**, (2012) 5 SCC 157, the Hon'ble Court made a distinction between an inordinate delay and a delay which is of few days. It was held that in the former, the

consideration of prejudice is a relevant factor and in the latter case, no such consideration arises.

11. In para-7 of the application for condonation of delay, learned counsel for applicant submits that grave prejudice would be caused to the applicant if the present application is not allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned as prayed for and that no prejudice shall be caused to the respondent if the application is allowed and the appeal is heard on merits. He further submits that the delay of 120 days in filing the present appeal be condoned in exercise of the provisions contained under provision to Section 44(2) of the Act, 2016.
12. Learned counsel for respondent in reply to the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal submitted that averments contained in paragraph 3 & 4 of the application for condonation of delay does not constitute the sufficient cause as no evidence/medical certificate has been produced by the appellant in support of averments contained in paragraph-3 of the application for condonation of delay. It is further submitted that the present appeal is vexatious and has been filed by the appellant after lapse of about 120 days after the expiry of statutory period of 60 days without any justifiable grounds but just to harass the respondent and hence the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal deserves to be rejected on this ground.
 - 12.1 The appellant has filed the application for condonation of delay on the basis of baseless facts and circumstances without any sufficient supporting documents in support to the averments made in application for condonation of delay.
 - 12.2 The object of law of limitation is in accordance with the maxim "*interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium*" i.e., the interest of the State requires that there should be an end of litigation. Statutes of limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose. Rule of vigilance which is foundation of statute of limitation rests on principles of public policy. The purpose of rules of limitation is to

induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. Parties who seek to uphold their legal rights should be vigilant and should consult their legal experts as quickly as possible. They cannot sleep over the matter and, at a later stage, seek to enforce their rights, which is likely to cause prejudice to their opponents.

12.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as Hon'ble High Court has held in various cases that for the purpose of the condonation of delay day to day delay after the expiry of limitation is to be explained but in the present case the Appellant has not given any specific reason for condoning the delay so the application for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that in case of *Civil Appeal no. 6974 of 2013 of Baswaraj and Anr vs The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer with civil appeal no. 6975 of 2013 of Baswaraj and Anr vs The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, decided on 22.08.2013*, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has pleased to hold the view that-

“It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “*dura lex sed lex*” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

12.4 In view of the reasons mentioned above, the appellant's application for condonation of delay along with the appeal is liable to be rejected, in the interest of justice.

13. Now we proceed to examine the issue of condonation of delay, bonafides, sufficient cause shown, and the factors required to be considered in the light of various pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex

Court where the principles are culled out on the issue of condonation of delay.

14. In the case of ***Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others*** [(2013)12 SCC 649], Hon'ble Apex Court enunciated broad principles in paras 21 and 22 as follows:-

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalize injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9 (ix) *The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.*

21.10 (x) *If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.*

21.11 (xi) *It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.*

21.12(xii) *The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.*

21.13(xiii) *The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.*

22. *To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:*

22.1 (a) *An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.*

22.2 (b) *An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.*

22.3(c) *Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.*

22.4 (d) *The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed of course, within legal parameters."*

Thus, broadly speaking, the approach, while considering a prayer or application seeking condonation of delay in instituting any proceedings,

which should be adopted by a court or a judicial forum is that it should not proceed on the premise or assumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate and that the primary function of the court or of an adjudicatory authority is to adjudicate the dispute, rather than to shut its door to a litigant or a party.

15. The Apex Court in ***Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal V/s Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1962 (2) SCR 762: AIR 1962 SC 361*** while construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 has held that the Court should bear in mind two important considerations while dealing with the explanation for condonation of delay. Firstly, that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which accrues to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed, and secondly, that if sufficient cause for the delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay. The Apex Court, however, has further ruled that:-

“It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

16. In ***Arjun Singh V. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993***, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every sufficient cause is a good cause and vice versa. However if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree proof than that of sufficient cause.

17. Further the expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (*Vide: Madanlal V. Shyamlal AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. V. Gobardhan Sao and Ors. AIR 2002 SC 120*).

18. In the case of *Pundik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448* it is observed that :-

“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

19. In *Basawaaj and Ors V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer: (2013) 14 SCC 81*, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 9 & 15 was pleased to observe that:-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which

provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

"15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

20. In ***Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh &Ors [(2010) 8 SCC 685]***, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the expression "sufficient cause" to mean the presence of legal and adequate reasons. Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-

“8. There is no question of construing the expression of ‘sufficient cause’ liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establish the cause for the appellant’s default in applying within time for the impleading the legal representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the abatement.”

21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Katari Surayanarayana Vs. Koppiseti Subba Rao***, reported in **AIR 2009, SC 2907** again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of expression ‘sufficient cause’. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of *Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vs. Bhargavi Amma*, reported in **(2008) 8 SCC 321** in its para 9 held as under:

“9. The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial

justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vs. Bhargavi Amma*** (*supra*) enunciated the following principles in paragraph 13 which need to be kept in mind while dealing an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Paragraph 13 is as under:-

“13. (i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.

(iv) *The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects.*

(v) *Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal."*

23. The Hon'ble Privy Council in the case of '**General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim**' reported in (1939-40) 67 IA 416; (1941) 53 LW 212 : AIR 1941 PC 6 held as under:-

"A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law."

24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of *University of Delhi Vs. Union of India & Ors.* [Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019 arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 5581-5582 of 2019] in the month of December, 2019 while dismissing the appeal observed that the learned single Judge was not only justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the decision of Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do not call for any interference, while examining the judgment of *Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors* (1992)2 SCC 598 wherein it has been indicated that the real test to determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to the Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence, further in the matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice.

The Hon'ble Apex Court further opined that condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective and in that back ground while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the facts of the situation. It has been further observed that in the case of *Katiji (Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji&ors.)* decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 19.02.1987, the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.

The Hon'ble Apex Court was further pleased to observe that in the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with.

25. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India and another*** (2012)³ Supreme Court Cases 563 was pleased to hold that law of limitation binds everybody equally and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for any party. Paragraphs 27 to 30 of the said judgment are as follows:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

26. Admittedly the impugned order dated 02.01.2023 was uploaded on the website of the RERA on 03.01.2023. The limitation for filing the appeal was upto 04.03.2023 and the appeal was filed on 14.07.2023 with delay of about 120 days. As per endorsement on the certified copy of the impugned order, the applicant applied for certified copy of the impugned order on 04.01.2023 and the same was received by the applicant on 07.01.2023.
27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its latest judgment passed in ***Civil Appeal No.3327 of 2020, V. Nagarajan Vs. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd & ors*** dated 22.10.2021 was pleased to observe that application for certified copy has to be made before expiry of the limitation period to claim benefit of exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy and if no application for certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the act of filing application for a certified copy is not just technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion.
28. At this stage we would like to refer the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in SLPNo.2054-2055/2022 ***Lingeswaran etc. Vs. Thirunagalingam*** decided on 25th February, 2022, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC)227 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that the court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Para 5 of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows:-

“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of *Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer*, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

5.1 In the case of *Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai*, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.”

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Boutique Hotels India (P) Ltd. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 3(1), New Delhi***, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine ITAT 14448, while examining the

pleader's gross negligence or mistaken advice given by a lawyer negligently and without care, was pleased to hold that it is not a sufficient cause to condone the delay. The observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as under:--

“A conscious decision by the assessee to not file appeal, does not take the character of sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 253(5) of I.T.Act. When it is consciously decided by assessee to not avail of right of filing of appeal and to, instead, only avail of right of filing Cross Objection, then the fact that Revenue did not file appeal, and thereby did not present the assessee with an opportunity for filing the Cross Objection; cannot constitute ‘sufficient cause’ for the assessee for not filing the appeal within the time limit prescribed u/s 253(3) of I.T.Act.”

“On overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that not only was there gross negligence on the part of the assessee in filing of this appeal within time prescribed u/s 253(3) of I.T.Act, but also complete absence of sufficient cause. The assessee is seeking an unfettered free play in filing of the appeal at whatever time it pleases even after substantial delay without sufficient cause. Despite inaction and negligence, condonation of delay has been sought on fanciful and concocted grounds. We do not wish to promote the notion that ITAT is required to condone the delay in filing of appeal even when there is complete absence of sufficient cause for the delay. We wish to discourage the tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter. The lackadaisical propensity for delay exhibited in a non-challant way needs to be curbed.”

“.... a pleader's gross carelessness affords no ground for condonation of delay; that a legal advisor's mistake, in order to justify condonation of delay must be a bonafide mistake; that mistaken advice given by a lawyer negligently and without due care is not sufficient cause; that the mistake should be such, which even a skilled legal

advisor, well-versed and experienced in law might make that mistake; that, the fact that there was lawyer's wrong advice has to be proved by the party seeking condonation of delay; and that the Counsel must disclose the circumstances in which incorrect advice was given and, it is not sufficient to make a perfunctory and general statement that wrong advice was given bonafide."

30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited***, reported in (2021)6 SCC 460, followed its observation made earlier in the case of ***Basawaraj Vs. LAO (2013) 14 SCC 81***, which is quoted below:--

"15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court should be justified in condoning such inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time, condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

31. In the case of ***Sabarmati Gas Ltd. Vs. Shah Alloys Ltd.***, reported in (2023)3 SCC 229 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

"40. As relates Section 5 of the Limitation Act showing "sufficient cause" is the only criterion for condoning

delay. "Sufficient cause" is the cause for which a party could not be blamed."

32. We would like to add further that the purpose of prescribing period of limitation is not to destroy the right of parties. It is meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The period of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim *interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium* (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
33. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis we found that the impugned order dated 02.01.2023, passed by the Adjudicating Officer of the Regulatory Authority was uploaded on the portal of UP RERA on 03.01.2023. The present appeal ought to have been filed by 04.03.2023 but the appeal was filed on 14.07.2023 with delay of about 120 days. As per endorsement on the certified copy of the impugned order, the applicant applied for certified copy of the impugned order on 04.01.2023 and the same was received on 07.01.2023. The explanation for delay given by the appellant that their counsel suffered from kidney ailment and was treated at Jaypee Hospital Noida and when the counsel recovered from the ailment the present appeal is being filed is not supported by any documentary evidence. We have no hesitation in observing that the applicant failed to show sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 120 days which could warrant us to exercise our discretion for the purpose of condoning the delay after appreciating the same.

34. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is **rejected**. Consequently Appeal No. D733/2023 is also **dismissed**.
35. Now the question arose as to what is to be done with respect to the amount deposited by the appellant/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority u/s 43(5) of the Act, 2016.
36. The aims and objects of the Act is to provide for regulation and promotion of the real estate sector in an efficient and transparent manner and to protect the interests of the consumers in real estate sector. Proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act specifically provides that where a promoter files an appeal with the Appellate Tribunal, it shall not be entertained without the promoter first having deposited with the Appellate Tribunal at least 30% of the penalty, or such higher percentage as determined by the Appellate Tribunal, or the total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation imposed on him before the said appeal is heard. The intent of the legislature is quite clear from the wording of proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act that the interest of the consumers i.e. allottees/buyers be protected.
37. The intent of the legislature in laying down the provision of pre-deposit of the amount of penalty or any other amount payable to the allottee by the promoter before the appeal can be heard in the Appellate Tribunal, has been elucidated by the **Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 127** of its judgment in the **Civil Appeal Numbers 6745-6749 of 2021 M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of UP** and others, the same reads as under:-

“127. It may further be noticed that under the present real estate sector which is now being regulated under the provisions of the Act 2016, the complaint for refund of the amount of payment which the allottee/consumer has deposited with the promoter and at a later stage, when the promoter is unable to hand over possession in breach of the conditions of the agreement between the parties, are being instituted at the instance of the consumer/allottee demanding for refund of the amount

deposited by them and after the scrutiny of facts being made based on the contemporaneous documentary evidence on record made available by the respective parties, the legislature in its wisdom has intended to ensure that the money which has been computed by the authority at least must be safeguarded if the promoter intends to prefer an appeal before the tribunal and in case, the appeal fails at a later stage, it becomes difficult for the consumer/allottee to get the amount recovered which has been determined by the authority and to avoid the consumer/allottee to go from pillar to post for recovery of the amount that has been determined by the authority in fact, belongs to the allottee at a later stage could be saved from all the miseries which come forward against him.”

38. The Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that the legislature in its wisdom intended to ensure that the money which has been computed by the Authority at least must be safeguarded if the promoter intends to prefer an appeal before the Tribunal and in case, the appeal fails at a later stage, it should not be difficult for the consumer/allottee to get the amount recovered which has been determined by the Authority. It is in order to avoid the consumer/allottee to go from pillar to post for recovery of the amount that has been determined by the Authority that the legislature has in its wisdom laid the condition of pre-deposit by the promoter under Section 43(5) of the Act.
39. Section 40(1) of the Act of 2016 provides for a mechanism for recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of orders etc. of the A.O. or the Regulatory Authority, or the Appellate Tribunal and the same shall be recoverable in such manner as may be prescribed as an arrears of land revenue. The **Hon’ble Apex Court** vide **paragraph 140** in **M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of UP** (supra) was pleased to observe that:-

“140. It is settled principle of law that if the plain interpretation does not fulfill the mandate and object of the

Act, this Court has to interpret the law in consonance with the spirit and purpose of the statute. There is indeed a visible inconsistency in the powers of the authority regarding refund of the amount received by the promoter and the provision of law in Section 18 and the text of the provision by which such refund can be referred under Section 40(1). While harmonizing the construction of the scheme of the Act with the right of recovery as mandated in Section 40(1) of the Act keeping in mind the intention of the legislature to provide for a speedy recovery of the amount invested by the allottee along with the interest incurred thereon is self explanatory. However, if Section 40(1) is strictly construed and it is understood to mean that only penalty and interest on the principal amount are recoverable as arrears of land revenue, it would defeat the basic purpose of the Act.”

40. As can be seen from the above observations, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even the principal amount invested by the allottee can be recovered as arrears of land revenue under Section 40(1) of the Act. It is further clarified by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the intention of the legislature is to provide a mechanism for early recovery of the amount invested by the allottee along with the interest incurred thereon.
41. Rule 23 of the U.P. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2016 provides that subject to the provisions of Section 40(1), the recovery of the amounts due as arrears of land revenue shall be carried out in the manner provided in the local laws. As Rule 23 has been framed under the provisions of Section 40(1) of the Act, the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court on Section 40(1) shall equally apply to Rule 23 of the Rules 2016.
42. Although Section 40(1) of the Act of 2016 gives powers to the Appellate Tribunal to enforce its decisions, but the Tribunal does not have adequate infrastructure and the required sufficient human resource to determine and certify the amount due from the appellant/promoter to be paid to the respondent/allottee.

43. It is our considered view that as per provisions of the Act and as per the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is the duty of the Tribunal to arrange to transfer the pre-deposited money to the concerned allottee/consumer in case the promoter's appeal is dismissed. However, since the promoter might not have paid the full payable amount or there being a prospect of some amount having already been recovered from the promoter under execution proceedings at the level of the Authority or AO, it is just and lawful that the Tribunal transfers the amount to the Authority for transferring the same to the allottee/consumer after due diligence at its end and to recover any additional amount which could be due to be paid by the promoter; or return to the promoter any amount that could be in excess of the entitlement of the allottee/consumer.
44. The calculation of the exact amount due to be paid to the respondent/allottee normally is to be determined up to the date of actual payment. As the facts and figures are available with the Regulatory Authority, which is executing its or A.O.'s original order, therefore, due diligence is required while calculating the amount payable, interest thereon, as well as verification of the payments made by the allottee from time to time, etc.
45. In the instant case, the appeal of the applicant (Appeal No.D733/2023) has been **dismissed** for want of '**sufficient cause**' to condone the delay in filing the instant appeal. We, therefore, direct the Registry to transfer the entire amount deposited by the appellant/promoter under the provisions of Section 43(5) of the Act to the concerned account of the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority (U.P. RERA). Further, we direct the Regulatory Authority to dispose of this amount during the execution proceedings in accordance with its order dated 24.06.2022.
46. The functioning of the Tribunal became paperless from January 2022, but the system for depositing payment through online mode by the litigants under different heads could not be made operational and the same was to be deposited by the litigants in the shape of Bank Draft, but subsequently NIC and State Bank of India succeeded in providing solution for making payment under all the heads through online mode and the State Bank of India also agreed to convert the amount deposited

by the promoter under Section 43(5) of the Act into fixed deposit indicating complaint number, appeal number etc. within 24 hours for a period of 60 days with auto renewal thereafter, so that after decision in the appeal the amount be released as per direction of the Tribunal along with accrued interest on the said fixed deposit.

47. Discussion was made with the officials of the State Bank of India regarding providing benefit of interest on the deposited amount in the pending appeals. SBI also agreed to convert the amount deposited in different appeals, on the details provided by the Tribunal, into Fixed Deposits for a period of 60 days with auto renewal thereafter in the pending appeals. Accordingly, in all the pending appeals of the promoters, the amount deposited in pursuance to the provisions of Section 43(5) of the Act has been converted in fixed deposit in the month of June, 2023.
48. The Registry is directed to take steps for redemption of the amount of the fixed deposit in the instant appeal and send the same to the Regulatory Authority to be taken care as per the directions hereinabove.
49. It will be the liability of the beneficiary to pay the income tax on the interest earned on the deposited amount, if any.

Dated:13.05.2024
Irfan

(Sanjai Khare)

(D.K. Arora)